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1 Introduction
The thermal images were taken late at ni-ght. They showed the tents pitched by Oc-cupy London Stock Exchange outside of St 
Paul’s cathedral. The newspaper article in the 
Daily Mail – who had commissioned an ‘inde-
pendent thermal imaging company’ to take the 
pictures – offered this helpful guide to readers 
attempting to understand the multicoloured 
smudges:
In these shots, taken late on Monday night, 
the presence of body heat from humans is re-
presented by yellow and red inside the tents. 
The tents that are coloured purple indicate 
they are colder and thus empty. The buildings 
behind are also yellow and red because of the 
higher temperatures inside (Daily Mail, 26th 
October 2011).
Taken together, the images appeared to 
show the majority of the tents as purple, mea-
ning that they were not heated by body warmth 
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and ‘thus empty’. What could be the relevan-
ce of such a complex (and highly contestable) 
chain of reasoning? The article proceeded to 
explain that ‘the images suggest the vast ma-
jority of the demonstrators who gather around 
the cathedral to denounce capitalism during 
the day go home or to a hotel to stay warm at 
night’ (ibid). The conclusion being that Occupy 
London Stock Exchange was in effect running 
‘an almost entirely part time protest’ (ibid).
As a newspaper, the Daily Mail has a lon-
gstanding and explicit right-wing agenda. It 
is a champion of the neoliberal free-market 
politics that have created and continue to su-
pport the activities of London based financial 
markets and banks, despite the overwhelming 
evidence of manifold failings of the latter. The 
newspaper is certainly no friend of the Occu-
py movement. But what the Daily Mail loves 
even more than neoliberalism is exposing hy-
pocrisy. How can these protestors expect us 
to take them seriously when they sit in their 
tents with their premium brand takeaway co-
ffees, sending tweets from their smart phones, 
and then retreating home at night to sleep in 
their comfortable beds? They say they want to 
dismantle capitalism, but they indulge them-
selves in all that it offers. They say they want 
another world, but they do not have the cou-
rage of their convictions. They are not an op-
position: they are parasites. They take what 
capitalism offers and give nothing in return.
Hypocrisy is a serious accusation. The hy-
pocrite says one thing, yet does another. They 
claim to hold one position, one belief, and yet 
act as though they cleave to a very different 
set of views. They cannot be trusted because 
they cannot be pinned down – we do not know 
what to believe about them. Worse still, the 
hypocrite allows themselves the luxuries and 
rights that they would deny others. In doing so 
they take without giving back. They help them-
selves to what they system has to offer whilst 
denouncing it in public.
The logic on which this accusation is ba-
sed is very ancient. It is the logic of identi-
ty, non-contradiction and mutual exclusivity. 
One is either for or against. One either belie-
ves or disbelieves. No middle ground is pos-
sible. Propositions are either necessarily true 
or necessarily false. The Occupy movement 
is either against capitalism or for capitalism. 
And this must be as a whole, for there can be 
no equivocation, no tolerance of ambiguity. To 
lack determination here is simply hypocrisy – a 
violation of both sound logic and strong moral 
precepts. 
But this logic is faulty. It assumes a stabi-
lity and an identity in respect to the world to 
which its propositions refer that is supported 
by neither history nor, indeed, contemporary 
journalism. It implicitly relies upon there being 
a position from which judgments about the ex-
clusivity and non-contradictory nature of pro-
positions can be made that is never specified 
or directly articulated. Perhaps most importan-
tly, it is a logic which runs entirely counter to 
the received common wisdom of contemporary 
mathematics, in particular set theory and ‘fu-
zzy logic’. 
What kind of logic ought we instead to turn 
to in order to make sense of the claims leveled 
against the Occupy movement? In this paper 
I will describe how the work of Michel Serres, 
in particular his book The Parasite, provides a 
set of concepts for thinking indeterminacy and 
transformation in social systems. Rather than 
simply rejecting the idea of parasitism (and 
hypocrisy) as mere empty insults, Serres’ work 
allows us to revalorise the terms in such a way 
that they can be seen as essential to an ade-
quate understanding of how what we call the 
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social is ordered. In fact it allows us to consider 
social ordering as just one instance of a wider 
set of operations and logics that are at work 
across all living organisms and systems. As we 
will see, the parasite is not an exception, a vio-
lation of sound logical and moral principles, but 
rather their very condition.
2 Foundations
The terms postmodernism and post-struc-
turalism are often used in characterizing the 
dominant trends in European social-cultural 
theory over the past three decades and the 
corresponding philosophical resources that 
they have typically drawn upon (e.g. DERRI-
DA; FOUCAULT; DELEUZE). It would be more 
accurate to describe the problematic that is 
being responded to here as essentially post-
-Kantian, involving the elimination of transcen-
dence. If Kant offers critique as the solution to 
the excesses of both dualism and empiricism, 
then it comes of the cost of reinforcing a trans-
cendental dimension to human affairs that re-
sists further specification. 
For social-cultural theory this takes the 
form of what Donna Haraway (1991) famously 
referred to as a ‘God trick’: at the heart of the-
ory there are a set of categories that claim to 
provide foundations, objectivity and the groun-
ds for good judgment, whilst denying their own 
contingency and partial nature relative to a 
specific epistemic formation. The post-Kantian 
move is to subject such categories to relentless 
deconstruction in order to shift the work of 
analysis towards terms and propositions that 
are clearly situated in locally contingent – and 
hence contestable – epistemic practices. 
The effect of this strategy is to produce 
‘flat’ versions of social order in which possi-
ble sources of dualism and transcendence have 
been eliminated. For example, the distinction 
between agents and structure is problematic 
because it implies a third transcendental posi-
tion underpinning social order from which the 
distinction between individual agents and im-
personal structures is produced (or ‘miracula-
ted’ as Deleuze would put it). This leads to an 
automatic and tautological partitioning of the 
empirical field in advance of analysis that le-
aves the sources of agency uninspected (e.g. 
agents have agency because they are agents, 
structure does not have agency because it is 
what is ‘not-agent’). By contrast, an approach 
such as Actor-Network Theory (ANT) attributes 
agency to whatever entities may be seen to 
act within a given empirical field, and renders 
structures as the connections and pathways 
(i.e. networks) that emerge between these ge-
neralized agents. 
Theories such as ANT draw on a philoso-
phical tradition that attempts to bypass Kan-
tianism (see for example Deleuze & Guattari’s 
1994 ‘geophilosophy’). Major figures in this al-
ternative history of western philosophy include 
Spinoza and Leibniz, who each, in their own 
particular way, articulated a form of monism or 
non-transcendental philosophical foundations. 
Traditional distinctions, such as between sub-
ject and object, or social and technical, have 
no place here. Whilst such approaches deprive 
social-cultural theory of its ability to make a 
priori distinctions between, for example, hu-
man and non-human agents, they are richly 
instructive in their strategies for analyzing or-
der as an emergent effect of ‘supra-empirical’ 
processes (for instance, the affective encoun-
ters between bodies-in-relations in Spinoza’s 
work). 
However post (and pre-) Kantianism en-
counters a particular difficulty in its thinking 
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of the relation between the one and the mul-
tiple. If there is no outside, no transcendental 
aspect to the monadic field in which individual 
entities are situated, then from what position is 
the distinction between individuality and multi-
plicity to be accomplished, without an endless 
regress where these terms collapse into one 
another? Deleuze & Guattari (1988) once des-
cribed this position as the ‘magic formula we 
all seek – PLURALISM=MONISM’ (p. 20). The 
word formula is no accident here. The post-
-Kantian tradition has often turned to mathe-
matics and theoretical physics for inspiration, 
be in it Henri Bergson’s (1913/2001) use of 
distinctions between extensive and intensive 
multiplicities or Alain Badiou’s (2008) more re-
cent explorations of set theory. 
The place of the work of Michel Serres in 
this tradition is complex. Despite having writ-
ten around sixty books, Serres has by any con-
ceivable criterion been far less influential than 
peers such as Foucault and Deleuze. Although 
he has been and remains a prodigious author 
(averaging a book a year for the past four de-
cades), only a small minority of his work has 
been translated from his native French. This 
relative neglect of his work, particular in An-
glophone scholarship, has often been rema-
rked upon (PAULSON, 1997), and despite 
numerous attempts to provide introductory 
routes into his work for a broader audience 
(see SERRES; LATOUR, 1995; ABBAS, 2005; 
ASSAD, 1999; BROWN, 2002; CONNOR, 2009; 
LATOUR, 1987), there is little evidence that the 
situation is likely to change dramatically. 
Why then should we trouble ourselves to 
make sense of concepts from Serres’ work, 
such as that of the parasite? I argue that we 
need to do so because, unlike many of his con-
temporaries, Serres has systematically enga-
ged with the key problems of human and social 
sciences from a post-Kantian perspective. He 
offers a genuinely transdisciplinary approa-
ch to thinking issues such as the distribution 
of human and non-human agency in a way 
which does not re-instate the priority and au-
thority of philosophy (hence his influence on 
ANT). Moreover, Serres work has always been 
engaged with social issues, be it the threat of 
ecological disaster in The Natural Contract or 
the transformation of human relations throu-
gh information communication technologies in 
Angels. Post Kantian social and human science 
can therefore stand to gain much by following 
his treatment of collectivity, individuality and 
thinking the relation itself.
3 Communication
Take a basic problem. There are two entities 
– A and B – between which we sketch out a re-
lation. They could be two people passing each 
other on the street, two organizations passing 
electronic messages, or the conflict between a 
protest group and a right wing tabloid newspa-
per. How is communication possible here? In 
classical terms we would begin by defining the 
identity of each entity, what each is and is not, 
before going on determine the possible form of 
their relationship. 
But this would immediately present us with 
a problem. To establish the identity of A such 
that A=A, we need to make a contrast with 
everything that is ‘not A’, which includes B (and 
likewise to determine the identity of B). This 
results in a fundamental asymmetry – from 
A’s perspective, B’s message emanates from a 
world which fundamentally determined by its 
quality of being ‘not A’ (with the converse true 
of B’s perspective). We do not have a relation 
of equal partners, but rather two incommen-
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surable perspectives on the world defined by 
mutual exclusivity (like the slumbering mona-
ds described by Leibniz). Once again – how is 
communication possible here?
The solution, which is ostensibly forbidden 
by classical logic, but which actually forms its 
grounds, is to point to a third element. This 
could be the medium in which A and B are 
jointly situated (e.g. the street, the internet, 
a public forum). Or it might be a further entity 
– C – who serves as an intermediary. It is not 
crucial to establish whether this third element 
is medium or being. We need only recognize 
that in order to understand the communication 
between A and B we need a form of mediation, 
a third space or as Serres (1982b) sometimes 
calls it a ‘third man’. 
The ‘third man’ is the space that is automa-
tically required to make communication possi-
ble – ‘a third exists before the other … I have 
to go through the middle before reaching the 
end. There is always a mediate, a middle, and 
intermediary’ (SERRES, 1982a, p. 57). If this 
third did not exist we would have to treat A 
and B as either utterly incommensurable or as 
completely identical. The introduction of the 
third is the point of exchange, the crossroads 
through which communication happens. Serres 
calls this third ‘the parasite’. 
First definition of the parasite – to one side of 
(‘para’) the location of the event (‘site’) – the 
medium or being through which communica-
tion must pass
Together, the three elements (A, B and the 
third, the parasite) form a system. This sys-
tem is not harmonious since the messages 
that pass between A and B occur through the 
parasite, which introduces something of their 
own into the exchange. From the perspectives 
of either A or B, this represents ‘noise’, some-
thing added to the ‘signal’ that is sent from one 
to the other. And yet without this noise that 
naturally occurs by virtue of the presence of 
the parasite, no signal would be possible in the 
first place. This creates an elegant paradox:
Given, two stations and a channel. They ex-
change messages. If the relation succeeds, it 
is perfect, optimum, and immediate; it disa-
ppears as a relation. If it is there, if it exists, 
that means that it failed. It is only mediation. 
Relation is nonrelation. And that is what the 
parasite is. The channel carries the flow, but it 
cannot disappear as a channel, and it brakes 
(breaks) the follow, more or less (SERRES, 
1982a, p. 79).
Communication depends upon mediation 
– the channel, the parasite. But it must also 
simultaneously ‘repress’ the fact of this me-
diation to be successful, to appear immedia-
te. This is the classic paradox of mediation, we 
‘forget’ the medium in order to focus on the 
message. The closest parallel here is with the 
experience of our own bodies. When the body 
functions well, we are able to ignore it. It is 
only when it breaks down in some way, when 
we become ill, that the fundamental mediation 
of life by the body becomes apparent – ‘health 
is the silence of the organs’ (ibid, p. 197). 
The introduction of noise by the parasite 
has an interesting effect on the system. Serres 
relies upon a proposition made by the biophy-
sicist Henri Atlan (1974). In a living system, 
a message passed from A to B consists of a 
mixture of signal and noise. From the pers-
pective of A, the noise is extraneous, a threat 
to the successful reception of the signal. But 
from the perspective of B, this mixture of sig-
nal and noise need not necessarily be grasped 
in the same way. Noise ‘cuts’ the signal in such 
a way that what is received is very different 
from what was sent. To put this in a different 
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context, when we listen to what another says, 
we also take in the hesitations, the changes in 
emphasis, the slips of the tongue in what they 
say. For the speaker these are all just ‘noise’ to 
be overcome. But for us, as listener, these may 
significantly alter our understanding of what is 
being said. Noise and signal are differentially 
distributed depending on the position one oc-
cupies in a communicative set up. 
Serres likens this effect to that of a rin-
ging telephone at a dinner party. The host 
and guests are sat enjoying their conversation 
when the noise of the telephone begins outside 
the room. At first the host tries to ignore this 
interruption, but eventually it becomes unbea-
rable. She crosses the threshold and picks up 
the receiver. Now the conversation next door 
becomes the noise that is disturbing the call, at 
least until it is completed – ‘If I approach the 
table, the noise becomes conversation. In the 
system, noise and message exchange roles ac-
cording to the position of the observer and the 
action of the actor’ (SERRES, 1982a, p. 66). 
Second definition of the parasite – the ‘static’ 
that interrupts the transmission of a message
We began with the problem of communica-
tion between two entities, and rapidly arrived 
at a description of a message-bearing system 
passing by way of a third element, the parasite 
– ‘as soon as we are two, we are already three 
or four’ (ibid, p. 57). The parasite plays a dual 
role in the system. It makes communication 
possible by acting as the meditational means. 
But it also necessarily disrupts the message, 
in the same way that static affects radio trans-
missions. This disruption is not entirely nega-
tive – it transforms the nature of the message 
depending on the position of the receiver and 
their activities. 
For Serres, an adequate description of such 
as system cannot simply focus on the com-
municative partners and the message (as is 
typically done in social network theory, for 
instance). It must also include the role of the 
parasite:
Stations and paths together form a system. 
Points and line, beings and relations. What is 
interesting might be the construction of the 
system, the number and disposition of sta-
tions and paths. Or it might be the flow of 
messages passing through the lines… But one 
must also write as well of the interceptions, 
of the accidents in the flow along the way 
between stations – of changes and metamor-
phoses (SERRES, 1982a, p. 11).
Parasitism is integral to the functioning of 
the system. We might say that ‘systems work 
because they do not work. Nonfunctioning re-
mains essential to functioning’ (ibid, p. 79). We 
must study these interceptions and breakdo-
wns as a kind of subterranean rationality that 
is at work in the very constitution of the sys-
tem itself – the ‘dark side of the system’ (ibid, 
p. 12).
4 Exchange
La Fontaine told a version of a fable derived 
from Aesop called The City Rat and the Country 
Rat. The city rat invites their simple country 
cousin to visit so that he can sample fine living. 
Together they eat the leftovers of a feast held 
at the home of a tax farmer – ‘oil, butter, ham, 
bacon, cheese – everything is available’ (SER-
RES, 1982a, p. 3). But as they eat there is a 
loud noise, a disturbance at the door. The cou-
sins flee and hide from the noise. This is all too 
much for the country rat, who returns home, 
where the food is not so fancy, but at least one 
does not live in continuous fear.
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Third definition of the parasite – the uninvi-
ted guest or ‘social’ parasite
Serres repeats this fable as the pre-eminent 
example of how the parasite takes without giv-
ing. Parasitism appears to be a one-way re-
lationship. The host provides, supplies hospi-
tality, which the parasite takes without giving 
anything back in return. Or at least they con-
tinue to do this until they are discovered and 
driven out – in this case by the noise behind 
the door that forces them to abandon their 
meal in fear. Hospitality becomes hostility as 
the parasite is driven out.
What is particularly interesting in the tale 
of the two rats is that there are actually sev-
eral acts of parasitism linked together. The tax 
farmer is not the producer of the fine goods 
that have been served at the feast. He is a par-
asite. The tax farmer is parasitized by the city 
rat, who is in turn parasitized by the country 
rat. In this way parasites are organised in a 
progressive chain or cascade where ‘the para-
site parasites the parasites’ (ibid, p. 55). Al-
though the parasite is weaker than the host, 
and must exercise continuous vigilance for the 
sudden transformation of hospitality to hostil-
ity (as the country rat is shocked to discover), 
they are nearly always smaller than the host, 
often to the point of near invisibility. In prac-
tice the parasite ‘has but one enemy: the one 
who can replace him in his position of parasite’ 
(ibid, p. 107). 
Although the parasite appears to take with-
out giving back, this is not strictly accurate in 
most cases. Consider the uninvited guest who 
draws up their chair to the dinner table. They 
‘pay’ for their meal not with coins, but rather 
with their conviviality and fine story telling – 
‘he obtains the roast and pays for it with sto-
ries’ (ibid, p. 36). This is an exchange of sorts, 
albeit an apparently unequal one. This raises 
the obvious question of why a host would toler-
ate such a deal?
Serres explains this by marking a distinction 
between production and information. Unlike 
predators, who consume their prey whole, the 
parasite does not exhaust production. It would 
be better to say that the parasite parasitizes 
reproduction, the propagation of production, 
rather than production per se. The parasite re-
directs reproduction, it steers it in a new direc-
tion favourable to it. Serres liken this to the 
addition of information to energy. He tells the 
fable of ‘the blind man and the cripple’, where 
one has energy without information and the 
other has the converse capacities. When the 
paralyzed man is hoisted onto the blind man’s 
shoulders they make a new whole – a ‘crossed 
association of the material and the logical, and 
exchange of the solid for a voice’ (ibid, p. 36).
The parasite is a selector, a point of deci-
sion where a new diagonal path is established 
that redirects the flow of production. To raw 
production, they add information, creating a 
new direction for a system. In another fable, 
a hungry wretch wanders beneath the window 
of a restaurant kitchen. They savour the de-
licious smells coming from within, and their 
hunger feels somewhat satiated. But an out-
raged kitchen assistant observes this act and 
rushes out demanding payment. Before the 
dispute can come to blows, a third person ar-
rives. They propose to resolve the argument in 
the following way:
Give me a coin, he said. The wretch did so, 
frowning. He put the coin down on the si-
dewalk and with the heel of his shoe made it 
ring a bit. This noise, he said, giving his deci-
sion, is pay enough for the aroma of the tasty 
dishes (SERRES, 1982a, p. 34-5).
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Here is an unequal exchange – a sound pays 
for a smell. But it is still an exchange of sorts 
where previously no exchange at all was possi-
ble. Normally a substance (food) is exchanged 
with another substance (coin). But here the 
parasite, the third man, finds a way of crossing 
this exchange with another. The sound of the 
coin pays for the smell of the meal. In doing 
so they create something new, novelty appe-
ars in the system, an unexpected channel for 
communication is opened – ‘the parasite in-
vents something new. Since he does not eat 
like everyone else, he builds a new logic’ (ibid, 
p. 35).
The parasite does make a contribution to 
the host whom it parasitizes. It provides in-
formation and novelty in exchange for energy 
and production. Serres argues that this kind 
of exchange is fundamental to economics and 
to human relations. The human is the ultimate 
‘universal parasite’ who turns ‘everything and 
everyone around him’ into a ‘hospitable space’ 
(ibid, p. 24). At the origin of human society 
we find this parasitic logic of taking without gi-
ving – ‘man milks the cow, makes the steer 
work, makes a roof from the tree; they have 
all decided who the parasite it’ (ibid, p. 24). 
Before the human even begins to enter into 
pre-capitalist relations of exchange, we find 
unequal exchange. Thus ‘abuse value’ comes 
before ‘use value’. The parasite is not the cor-
ruptor of exchange relations, but rather their 
very foundation:
The parasite adopts a functional role; the 
host survives the parasite’s abuses of him – 
he even survives in the literal sense of the 
word; his life finds a reinforced equilibrium, 
like a sur-equilibrium. A kind of reversibility 
is seen on the ground of irreversibility. Use 
succeeds abuse, and exchange follows use. 
A contract can be imagined (SERRES, 1982a, 
p. 168).
What kind of contract would this be? Serres’ 
argument suggests that human relations are 
intrinsically parasitic, indeed that ‘man is a lou-
se for other men’ (ibid, p. 5). But can we really 
construct an adequate account of social orde-
ring on such an abusive and unequal basis?
5 History
Serres’ treatment of time represents a con-
tinuous thread running through all of his work 
(see ASSAD, 1999). Like Bergson before him, 
Serres has done much to emphasise that the 
‘irreversible time’ discovered by nineteenth 
century thermodynamics needs to become a 
proper object of thought for the social and hu-
man sciences. The processes that define living 
cannot be run backwards to reveal their initial 
conditions, in the way that that is suggested 
by ‘clock time’. Living is descent, a downward 
progress from differentiation through a long 
series of equilibriums that follow the energe-
tic thalweg leading toward indifferentiation and 
eventual stability: death. 
This is not to say that there is a single tem-
poral order that defines our lives. We should 
instead see experience, and indeed our own 
bodies, as something like ‘exchangers of time’ 
where ‘several chronies intertwine’ (SERRES, 
1982a, p. 72). Our lives are points of exchan-
ge where biological and evolutionary pulses of 
time become enchained with rhythms of social 
exchange and even ancient, mythic logics. So 
whilst parasitism, with its strategy of taking 
without giving, is emblematic of irreversibility, 
it gives rise to human relations that tend to-
wards other forms of timing. 
When the parasite gives information to 
energy they produce differentiation in a sys-
tem:
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The relation upsets equilibrium, making it 
deviate. If some equilibrium exists or ever 
existed somewhere, somehow, the introduc-
tion of the parasite in the system immedia-
tely provokes a difference, a disequilibrium. 
Immediately, the system changes; time has 
begun (SERRES, 1982a, p. 182).
A closed system at equilibrium knows no 
time, or rather it knows only the endless, cea-
seless time of the return to steady state. Living 
systems, by contrast, operate quite far from 
equilibrium states, oscillating between nume-
rous existing and emergent norms. What we 
call history begins with differentiation, diver-
gence. Serres likens it to an empty set or a 
white space that is invaded by the parasite, 
who chases out all the others, creating disequi-
librium – ‘the introduction of parasite in a sys-
tem is equivalent to the introduction of noise… 
time does not begin without its intervention’ 
(ibid, p. 184).
Recall the noise at the door that disturbed 
the city rat and the country rat, who then fled. 
The system returns to equilibrium, the para-
sites are chased out, the system is again an 
empty set. But who made the noise? A fur-
ther parasite… In this way the parasite both 
differentiates and de-differentiates. One para-
site kicks the system into life, whilst another 
returns it to its empty or blank state. History 
stops and starts with this endless invasion and 
purging of space by parasites. 
Fourth definition of the parasite – a living or-
ganism that takes without giving as it infects 
its host
This biological interpretation emphasises 
that the host may gain some benefit from its 
exposure to the parasite. Usually hosts can 
tolerate a parasite because of their relatively 
small size. Furthermore, on detecting the pa-
rasite, the host is able to develop strategies of 
adaptation:
The parasite gives the host the means to be 
safe from the parasite. The organism rein-
forces its resistance and increases its adap-
tability. It is moved a bit away from its equi-
librium and it is then even more strongly at 
equilibrium. The generous hosts are there-
fore stronger than the bodies without visits 
(SERRES, 1982a, p. 193).
We have mentioned before the phrase cited 
approvingly by Serres that ‘health is the silence 
of the organs’. This is usually attributed to the 
noted French surgeon and academician René 
Leriche, but was developed a greater length by 
George Canguilhem (1991). Both Leriche and 
Canguilhem argued that illness and pathology 
push the organism to adapt by shifting the nor-
mative basis of its functioning. Through illness, 
the organism discovers new modes of norma-
tivity. For Serres, the episodes of crisis repre-
sented by illness provoke an organic system 
to settle around ‘counternorms’. The parasite 
hardens the system against further parasitism. 
This same logic of norms and counternorms 
can be shifted to human relations. The meal at 
the dinner table, or the discussion at the table 
in Plato’s Symposium, is disrupted by the unin-
vited guest, the parasite. The existing guests 
then work together to expel the parasite, and 
in so doing become a different form of collec-
tive. 
Serres’ draws here upon Rene Girard’s 
(1978) account of scapegoating. For Girard, 
the scapegoat is a person who is an ‘innocent 
party who polarizes a universal hatred’ (1987, 
p. 5). This hatred emerges through a media-
ted form of emotion that Girard terms ‘mimetic 
desire’. Our desires are fundamentally based 
on taking those of others as models. Thus, vi-
cariously, what the other wants is what I want. 
92
Porto Alegre, v. 16, n. 1, jan./jun. 2013
ISSN impresso 1516-084X    ISSN digital 1982-1654
INFORMÁTICA NA EDUCAÇÃO: teoria & prática
Mimesis gives rise automatically to rivalry, as 
we come to see the other as an obstacle to 
the fulfilment of our desires. The solution is to 
nominate a particular individual – the scape-
goat – who will become the collective object 
of hatred, and whose expulsion or destruction 
will temporarily resolve the problem of rivalry.
For example, Job in the Old Testament is 
transformed from his status as ‘idol’ to ‘vic-
tim’ of his people, when he is threatened with 
violence and sacrifice (see GIRARD, 1987). 
Yet his suffering has a purpose. It safeguar-
ds the community by displacing their internal 
tensions that become reabsorbed in a ‘positive 
religion’ that develops around the ritual expul-
sion. Serres blends Girard’s account of scape-
goating with parasitism:
History hides the fact that man is the uni-
versal parasite, that everything and everyone 
around him is a hospitable space. Plants and 
animals are always his hosts; man is always 
necessarily their guest. Always taking, never 
giving. He bends the logic of exchange and of 
giving in his favour when he is dealing with 
nature as a whole. When he is dealing with 
his kind, he continues to do so; he wants to 
be the parasite of man as well. And his kind 
want to be so too. Hence rivalry (SERRES, 
1982a, p. 24). 
Since humans are parasites to one another, 
rivalry must occur, which is solved by sacrifi-
ce – the existing guests work together to ex-
pel the uninvited guest. Such expulsion helps 
to adapt social relations to subsequent acts of 
parasitism and shifts the basis of the commu-
nity towards new norms. The history of human 
relations is the history of parasitism, scapego-
ating and the provocation to adapt to new nor-
ms. It is not the ‘war of all against all’ that Ho-
bbes described. It is the war of all against one: 
the parasite who will become the scapegoat.
6 Power
The parasite becomes the scapegoat, who is 
expelled. But this does not end the matter: the 
parasite always comes back. Job, for example, 
returns to his people and becomes more cele-
brated and honoured than he was before his 
expulsion. This is the ‘return of the repressed’, 
as Serres puts it. To understand the signifi-
cance of this return we need to follow Serres’ 
account of property relations. Property comes 
from enclosure, from drawing a boundary or 
partition. The most basic form of this partitio-
ning is found in eating practices:
Whoever was a lodger for a long time, and 
thus in a group even in the most secret acts 
where the private is never safe, remembers 
someone who was not willing to divide the 
salad course. When the salad bowl came, he 
spat in it, and the greens were his. The salad 
was all his; no one argued with him (SERRES, 
1982a, p. 140).
Spitting on the food renders it unclean to 
others, but not to the one who spits – ‘as soon 
as you soil it … it is yours’ (ibid, p. 144). The 
origin of property is in this play of dirt and cle-
anliness. What is ours is always clean to us, 
however dirty is appears to others. One’s own 
dung smells good. 
Fifth definition of the parasite – the one who 
is always near to food, close to the meat
The parasite continuously interrupts the 
meal, seeking ways to make some of it their 
own, to transform what is common into their 
own property. Serres sees this transformation 
as not just pivotal to human relations, but also 
to knowledge itself. Throughout his work he re-
peats the story of the origins of geometry in 
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the work of the harpedonats who were charged 
with dividing up the fertile land left in the flood 
plain of the river Nile (see SERRES, 1982, p. 
178-180; SERRES, 1990). This required the te-
chnical invention of methods of measurement 
to judge disputed boundary lines. The white 
space is differentiated. Serres see this as akin 
to the grand foundational gestures made in 
philosophy. Descartes, for example, creates a 
white space through his stratagem of doubt, 
which is then differentiated into Cartesian rea-
son – ‘the Cartesian meditation eliminates, ex-
pels, banishes everything, hyperbolically… and 
this slate and this spot are the extent to which 
I am master and possessor of my own thought’ 
(SERRES, 1982a, p. 180).
The white space does not stay empty for 
long though. Like a freshly tilled garden, the 
parasites – the weeds, the rabbits – soon find a 
way to come back in. What is expelled returns. 
In fact, exchange itself is a kind of return. 
When we sell the fruits of our labour, what we 
gain is what we have expelled in a different 
form. Serres discusses the bible story of Jo-
seph who was envied and scapegoated by his 
brothers, who secretly sold him into slavery. 
The gold pieces are the first of his returns that 
punctuate the story. 
Money is, of course, the universal exchan-
ger, the ultimate instance of Marx’s ‘general 
equivalent’. For Serres it is the most abstract 
form taken by the parasite, a return of the re-
pressed. And if one’s own dung is never un-
clean then ‘money doesn’t smell. It is mine; 
it’s a little pile of shit; it doesn’t smell; it’s 
everyone’s. It is mine, yours, yet it is clean 
and hence exchangeable’ (ibid, p. 145). The 
greater the effort exerted to chase away the 
parasite, to purge the white space, to defend 
property, the more abstract the parasite be-
comes. If the parasite logic of ‘taking without 
giving’ is what grounds exchange, then money 
is its ultimate form.
Serres then offers a unique account of po-
wer. We have learned from Foucault (1979) to 
mistrust the idea of ‘sovereign power’ as cen-
tralised. Power is distributed, it infuses social 
relations in such a way that it acts upon our 
actions rather than proscribes. Serres takes 
this account one stage further. Power is part of 
the game of parasitism. The parasite does not 
seek to establish property rights, they merely 
exploit all such efforts at enclosure and create 
a vector where everything flows towards them. 
In the chain or cascade of parasites that opens 
up in every white space, the position of power 
is always found in she or he who comes last. 
From this position, one may parasitise all the 
others. Once again, the only thing the parasite 
fears is another parasite waiting behind them. 
Serres (1982b) refers to this as ‘the wolf’s 
game’, after a fable by Aesop. A wolf chances 
upon a lamb drinking from a stream. The wolf 
accuses the lamb of muddying his water. The 
lamb replies that they are drinking downstre-
am and could not possibly do so. In reply, the 
wolf accuses the lamb of having slandered him 
in the past and drags him off into the woods for 
slaughter. The game here is to arrive a position 
‘downstream’. It does not matter how this is 
done. The wolf makes an unfounded accusa-
tion that renders him as the aggrieved party 
– justice must be done. The king establishes a 
set of tributes such that a slice of production 
must always be reserved for him. The trader 
finds a way to short sell the market.
Power depends less on authority than it 
does upon the invention of technical means to 
come downstream, to be in the last position 
in a parasitic chain. The secret of power is the 
discovery of the ‘wolf’s game’, of the means to 
jump to the end of a cascade of parasites:
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He who is well-placed has the right to eat 
the others. It is always a question of a meal, 
of visitors and of guests. What does the lion 
give in exchange for his good? Nothing? Not 
entirely. An edict, a document, a passport, 
words and writing. He pays for his meal in 
well-turned, well written phrases. And thus 
he is in the position of a parasite, a universal 
parasite. One day we will have to understand 
why the strongest is the parasite – that is to 
say, the weakest – why the one whose only 
function is to eat is the one who commands. 
And speaks. We have found the place of poli-
tics (SERRES, 1982a, p. 26).
In order to play this game well, the para-
site needs a detailed understanding of space. 
They need to see points of connection, rou-
tes, boundaries, regions that can transformed 
– ‘the master is always a geometer, a topolo-
gist, and someone who knows space first of 
all’ (ibid, p. 59). If parasitism is fundamental 
form taken by power, then topology is its pre-
-eminent science and the mathematics of fuzzy 
sets its basic logic.
7 Society
We have seen how Serres uses the concept 
of the parasite to rethink some of the founda-
tions of human and social science (communi-
cation, exchange, history, power). We are now 
close to a substantive account of the ordering 
of social relations. This involves one of Serres’ 
most interesting and potential fruitful notions 
– the mutation of the parasite into a quasi-
-object.
Recall the story of Joseph. Most loved of his 
brothers, he is cast into the bottom of a well 
by his jealous rivals, who daub his clothes with 
blood to convince his father that he is dead. 
Sold into slavery, his skilful interpretation of 
Pharaoh’s dreams enables him to rise to the 
position of vizier. He is ultimately reunited with 
and saves the house of Israel. Joseph is exclu-
ded, but returns. He returns first in the form 
of money, then as vizier, and ultimately as the 
supporting bough of the Israelites. In this way 
Joseph seems to circulate between numerous 
identities and positions:
He is a slave, he is a majordomo; he is a 
prisoner; he is the bailiff of the jailor; the 
master of his brothers. Joseph is not fixed 
in his identity… For a long time, he is not re-
cognized, his justice is not known; he is both 
master and slave (SERRES, 1982a, p. 159).
This circulation between identities has a 
function. Joseph makes connections, he ena-
bles a pathway to be built between forms of 
order that otherwise could not communicate: 
Pharaoh with his dreams; the Egyptians with 
the famine; the House of Israel with its rival 
brothers. It is the capacity to transform, to be-
come the missing piece that forms the link that 
gives Joseph his unique trajectory through cir-
cumstances. Serres names Joseph as ‘joker’:
[I]t is especially a Judaic invention … that the 
one who is sacrificed is substituted, that su-
ddenly the victim is something else: a goat, 
a kid, but also the beginning of a completely 
other series. I shall call this object a joker … 
This white object, like a white domino, has 
no value so as to have every value. It has no 
identity, but its identity, its unique character, 
its difference, as they say, is to be, indiffe-
rently, this or that unit of a given set. The 
joker is king or jack, ace or seven or deuce 
… A is b, c, d, etc. Fuzzy. …That joker is a 
logical object that is both indispensable and 
fascinating. Placed in the middle or at the end 
of a series, a series that has a law of order, 
it permits it to bifurcate, to take on another 
appearance, another direction, a new order 
(SERRES, 1982a, p. 160).
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The joker is a card in a game that serves 
to alter the direction of play. It interrupts the 
game and makes a new set of moves possible. 
Likewise, the white or blank domino can chan-
ge the fortunes of a player because it can be 
played to link sequences of dominos that are 
otherwise incommensurable. In a way this spe-
cial object is both the weakest and strongest in 
the game. It has no particular value, and hen-
ce appears to be extraneous, worthy of being 
gotten rid of as soon as possible in favour of 
more valuable tokens. But at the same time it 
has the capacity to take on all possible values 
in the game, and at particular moments in the 
unfolding of the game it can be the most highly 
prized of all tokens. 
The story of Joseph demonstrates that 
jokers – those who are not fixed in identity 
and therefore can take on all identities – are 
indispensable to social order. They are tokens 
of exchange, and as such are traded, exclu-
ded, sacrificed. But they always return, and in 
so doing transform the social setting such that 
new connections and pathways are possible – 
‘the movement, the hesitation, the vibration, 
and the double frenzy of inclusion and exclu-
sion constitute the joker in a multiplicity of si-
tuations, in a spectrum of possibilities’ (ibid, p. 
161) The joker is a particular form of parasite 
that provokes activity within the system. It in-
troduces a change of play, a raising of stakes, 
a redistribution of fortunes in the game and 
possible outcomes.
Sixth definition of the parasite – a ‘thermal 
exciter’, that which catalyses the system to a 
new equilibrium state
The capacity for social ordering to proceed in 
different directions is relative to that of the 
joker:
The ramification of the network depends on 
the number of jokers. But I suspect there is 
a limit to this. When there are too many, we 
are lost as if in a labyrinth. What would a se-
ries be if there were only jokers? What could 
be said of it? (SERRES, 1982a, p. 162).
An ordered series depends on the presen-
ce of a joker to enable it to ramify, to make 
novel connections. Yet it also depends upon 
the comparative rarity of the joker. There must 
be clear and differentiated identities amongst 
the majority of its elements. There is no game 
when there are only jokers. Similarly, if there 
were no hosts, only parasites, then life would 
not be sustainable. For Serres, production or 
energy must be common, abundant, in order 
to sustain parasitism. The joker is the special 
or ‘rare’ element that circulates through the 
energetic pathways of the system.
Serres compares the movement of the joker 
to that of a token in a child’s game such as 
‘hunt the slipper’ or ‘button, button, who’s got 
the button?’ In such games, the aim is usu-
ally to pass on the token such that one is not 
holding it when the round of play stops. The 
players then gain their individual status throu-
gh the relationship they have with the token 
– ‘if he is discovered he is ‘it’. Who is the sub-
ject, who is an ‘I’ or who am I? The moving 
furet [token] weaves the ‘we’, the collective, if 
it stops, it marks the ‘I’’ (ibid, p. 225). 
A better example is that of a rugby match. 
Here the players arrange themselves in rela-
tion to the passing of the ball, which is the pri-
mary object on the pitch – ‘playing is nothing 
else but making oneself an attribute of the ball 
as a substance’ (ibid, p. 226). The movement 
of the ball will determine the ‘hero’ who sco-
res, the ‘villain’ who fails to intercept a pass, 
the ‘hog’ who fails to pass the ball on quickly 
enough. The subject (from subjectus xxx or 
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subjicere xxx) is literally she or he who is ‘put 
beneath’ or ‘subjugated’ to the movement of 
the ball. This gives the ball-token a curious 
status. It is certainly an object, but one with 
the remarkable power to mark out subjects, it 
is an ‘astonishing constructer of intersubjecti-
vity’ (ibid, p. 227). Serres calls such a token a 
‘quasi-object’:
This quasi-object is not an object, but it is 
one nevertheless since it is not a subject, 
since it is in the world; it is also a quasi-sub-
ject, since it marks or designates a subject, 
who, without it, would not be a subject… This 
quasi-object, when being passed, makes the 
collective, if it stops it makes the individual 
(SERRES, 1982a, p. 225).
A quasi-object is a joker-like token whose 
movement defines a collective. Who are we? 
Those who pass the ball. Who am I? The one 
who is marked out by the stopping of the ball. 
Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that 
the collective is the overall set of the set of 
plays where subjectivity is marked by the ball, 
by its movement – ‘participation is the passing 
of the ‘I’ by passing’ (ibid, p. 228). To be pi-
cked out in this way is a risk. The scapegoat 
is often the one ‘left holding the ball’ at end 
of a disastrous play. Once again we see how 
the collective is strengthened and transfor-
med – how it is ‘excited’ or ‘superheated’ – by 
the mechanism of exclusion. The quasi-object 
makes collectivity, selects individuals for exclu-
sion and re-makes the collective in the restar-
ting of the play.
The central proposition that Serres makes 
here is that social ordering is not a collecting 
together of individuals, but rather a set of sets 
of ‘plays’ around the quasi-object. There is 
no social contract as such, rather a material 
grounding of social relations with this special 
object, this joker, this peculiar parasite that is 
neither properly subject nor object but rather 
that upon which relationships as such betwe-
en persons are founded. It is the ‘elementary 
relation’ (ibid, p. 224) on which all relations of 
collectivity and individuality are to be unders-
tood.
8 The included third
Serres’ concept of the parasite has its place 
in a broader post-Kantian effort to challenge 
how we think identity. Serres particular contri-
bution is to demonstrate that the classical logic 
of the excluded middle is faulty and genera-
tes a ‘third man’ position from which identity 
is distributed. Personifying this ‘third man’ or 
‘third space’ as the parasite, Serres explores 
how thirdness both makes communication pos-
sible and interrupts it simultaneously. Echoing 
the slogan of Deleuze & Guattari in Anti-Oedi-
pus, Serres asserts that ‘things work because 
they don’t work’. We are only together because 
of the parasite.
Parasitism becomes, for Serres, the central 
‘fact’ of existence. Without interruption, a sys-
tem would be locked into an equilibrium state, 
entirely closed off the rest of the world. It is the 
inclusion of exteriority into a system, the inva-
sion of the host by the parasite, which acts to 
‘dope’ or ‘excite’ it. Transformation and chan-
ge are the outcomes of parasitic operations of 
analysis (redirection), paralysis (disturbance) 
and catalysis (transformation).
The parasite is the elementary form of re-
lations. It is the basis of intersubjectivity, of 
our ‘being together’. We must think of social 
ordering as one instance of a broader work of 
making and transforming relations through pa-
rasitism. Hence to seek a basis for social order 
in terms of some kind of contract or conflict 
between individuals is mistaken. Mediation, 
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‘thirdness’, is the necessary grounds for the 
intersubjective, indeed for subjectivity itself. 
Serres is then able to redescribe many of the 
fundamental concepts of the human and social 
sciences – communication, exchange, history, 
power, society – as outcomes of parasitized re-
lations. Abuse value is the basis of all value. 
The included third is what allows for the ex-
cluded third. Knowledge itself arises from the 
noise of the parasite.
Returning to our opening example, we can 
see that it is difficult to disentangle politics 
from parasitism. The Occupy movement are 
deemed as ‘hypocrites’ because they refuse to 
offer a single political position on economy and 
society. Yet they are wise to do so. Stations 
and positions are not sources of power, they 
are what are parasitized to produce power. She 
or he who makes a blank space, an enclosure, 
is simply issuing an invitation to the parasite. 
Change and transformation comes from dise-
quilibrium, redirecting flows, not stopping and 
defending them. 
The newspaper that hired the thermal ca-
meras was looking for energy, for warmth, for 
excitement. But it was looking in the wrong di-
rection. It ought to have turned the cameras 
on its own newsrooms. The ‘thermal excitation’ 
was being produced within the neoliberal me-
dia itself as it struggled to expel the parasite 
that Occupy London Stock Exchange represen-
ted. They were forced to utilise new technolo-
gies, such as thermal imaging, in the efforts 
to exclude this newly visible ‘uninvited guest’.
And what of the London Stock Exchange 
itself, that pulsating warm body of capital to 
which the neoliberal media is attached like a 
bloodsucking tick? Surely this actor, more than 
any other, properly deserves the title of parasi-
te! This entity has no other purpose than that 
of identifying ways to interrupt flows of pro-
duction, redirecting them through taking wi-
thout giving through the myriad meditational 
means offered by contemporary financial pro-
ducts and practices (i.e. securitization, short-
-selling, financial derivatives). This parasite is 
both higher up the chain – closer to the meat 
– and also capable of jumping to the end of the 
parasitic cascade. Boom or crisis, expansion or 
collapse, it matters not. Contemporary finan-
cial markets find a way to stand last in line, 
open mouthed, feeding.
I have called Serres’ work on the parasite 
a ‘dark organizational theory’. By this I do not 
mean it is a theory of organizations as such, 
but rather it is a generalised theory of orde-
ring, of mediation and relationships. Moreover, 
that it describes a complex topology of inter-
ruptions and interceptions, a ‘parasite logic’ 
that is in operation at the heart of organizing. 
From this it follows that if we want to produce 
an adequate account of, say, financial markets, 
the mass media or protest movement, we have 
to begin with a materialist description of the 
distribution and interruption of relations throu-
gh parasitism. We have to start with a noise 
that comes from outside. 
9 Afterword: applying The Parasite
The major approach in European social 
science to have adopted Michel Serres’ work 
is Actor-Network Theory (see LATOUR, 2005). 
The concept of the quasi-object is pivotal to 
understanding the particular way in whi-
ch ‘agency’ is distributed in networks (see 
CALLON, 1986; CALLON; LAW, 1997), and Ser-
res’ general approach to translation and me-
diation underpins the entire approach, parti-
cularly in its account of social relations (see 
LATOUR, 1993; CALLON, 1980).
Sociology and organization theory have 
tended to engage with Serres through ANT 
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(see CZARNIAWSKA; HERNES, 2005). Howe-
ver there have been some efforts to use the 
notions of joker and quasi-object directly. He-
therington & Lee (2000) offer an account of 
social relations as forged through ‘blank figu-
res’, whilst Brown & Middleton (2005) describe 
how work on a neo-natal intensive care unit 
is organized through ‘virtual objects/subjects’.
Work in social-cultural geography has used 
Serres’ topological approach to good effect. 
Raffel’s (2006) description of person-place 
relations, for example, and Lezuan’s (2011) 
analysis of the links between social policy and 
beekeeping, work extensively with the concept 
of parasitism.
Finally, Brown & Stenner (2009) draw at 
length upon Serres in their proposal for a ‘re-
flexive foundational’ approach to psycholo-
gy, where the psychological is understood as 
emerging from the overlapping mediations of 
the biological, social and the discursive. 
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